Weak realpolitik: The vicissitudes of Saudi bashing

AS ALL OF this history was being revived, reviewed and discussed, together with post-September 11 developments themselves, the Saudis shouted foul. They claimed, most pointedly, that a conspiracy was being mounted against them by the American media, averring sotto voce that this was because so many Jews occupy high positions in that media. Very much related, the Saudis sought to excuse their own reticence to help the United States by alleging, in the person of Crown Prince Abdallah himself on January 28, that Saudi reluctance flowed from justifiable anger throughout the Arab world over America's "absolute" support for Israel.

Now, Saudi attitudes toward Palestine and Israel, and toward Jews in the American media, may seem like side points considering all the other things that have impinged on U.S. and Saudi interests since September 11. But they are not. The Saudi leadership's approach to Palestine helps define its predicament, stuck as it is between the demands of its own society and its need for friendship and protection from the United States. Moreover, this predicament has been, and will remain, a central and uncomfortable fact in the American war on terrorism.

U.S.-Saudi disagreement over Palestinian-Israeli diplomacy had passed through a dramatic stage in the weeks just before September 11, and Saudi complaints after September 11 make little sense without an awareness of that drama. To understand either, however, some background is necessary.

While Saudi Arabia has for decades been ritually referred to by Americans and Europeans as "moderate", there has never been anything the least bit moderate about its basic view of Israel. Saudi religious figures and most Saudi citizens see Israel and Zionism in ways indistinguishable from Al-Qaeda or the Iranian mullahs at their worst (which they frequently are). They accept unquestioningly a passion-play version of the conflict that is entirely one-sided and, given the closed nature of Saudi society, few Saudis have ever even heard any other account. Israel stands irredeemably guilty of "original sin", Palestinians are ever and always mere innocent victims, and no wild Arab press exaggeration--or pure invention--of dark Israeli deeds is too bizarre to be believed. Partly on account of their educational indoctrination, too, many Saudis are avid consumers of anti-semitism, both vintage imported versions from Europe and fresh creations from the pens of contemporary Arabs. It may make at least back-page news in the United States when an official of the Saudi Ministry of Religious Affairs refers to American Jews as "brothers of apes and pigs" and calls on America to "get rid of its Jews", but it is occasion for nods and yawning inside the Kingdom. (10)

In light of this, it seems odd upon a moment's reflection that the Saudi political establishment has always supported Yasir Arafat, the leader and symbol of secular Palestinian nationalism, rather than Islamist alternatives, like Hamas, whose religious-based views are closer to those of Saudi clergy and society. That it has done so illustrates how the Saudi internal dilemma projects itself onto Saudi diplomacy. To be saddled with the political leadership of a weak state means to be simultaneously pragmatic in private and ideologically spotiess in public. While the royal family would probably accept any settlement over Palestine that would satisfy Arafat and the nationalists, the Kingdom has been very reluctant to take an active public part in any diplomacy that might in the end legitimate Israel's existence, within any borders whatsoever, for fear of the internal reaction it might provoke. (Crown Prince Abdallah's "speech in the desk" comment to Thomas Friedman about possible Saudi normalization with Israel m ight signal a lightening of that reluctance, but as of this writing, in late February, it is too soon to say.) For the Saudi leadership, in any event, Arafat is as moderate a figure as it dares to support.