Content provided in partnership with
Government Industry
Surrendering the initiative? C2 on the digitized battlefield
Military Review, Sept-Oct, 2003 by Jim Dunivan
New Technology, Old Challenges
Just as the Army experienced the devastating effects of the conflict between technology and command philosophy in Vietnam, digitization of the battlefield and reliance on information systems in Information-Age warfare poses many of the same challenges. Despite the era or the technology, the ultimate measure of C2 effectiveness remains unchanged--to act faster and more effectively than the enemy can to accomplish the mission at the least cost to the friendly force before the enemy can effectively act and react. (64) The Army must sustain the vital aspects of directive control and encourage, practice, and foster initiative at all levels to act in accordance with commander's intent.
- Most Popular Articles in News
- The Ten Best Laptop bags
- Tata plans cheapest-ever car for Indian market
- GLOBALIZATION AND THE DEVELOPMENT OF UNDERDEVELOPMENT OF THE THIRD WORLD
- Corn is good for you; Corn is not only a tasty treat, but also a cereal that ...
- THE 50 BEST STYLISH HANDBAGS TO CARRY
- More »
Having served as a major advocate for battlefield digitization, Franks warned, "We must be bold to change when change gets us increased combat power and bold to reject bad ideas. We must keep our eyes focused on combat power results ... not captivated or dazzled by technology." (65) Battlefield digitization has much to offer Information-Age leaders and commanders on the battlefield if used appropriately to maintain situational awareness and to facilitate information flow and management within levels of command. However, if leaders do not fight within the framework of directive control as stated in current doctrine or are not vigilant in empowering the leader on the ground to exercise mission command, the Army will once again go down the path to a climate of detailed control that could result in indecision, centralized execution, and loss of initiative on the battlefield. This, ultimately, could lead to failure in any conflict, despite technological superiority.
NOTES
(1.) Prussian Field Marshal Helmuth von Moltke, quoted in U.S. Army Field Manual (FM) 6-0, Command and Control (Washington, DC: U.S. Government Printing Office [GPO], Final draft, August 2000), 1-14.
(2.) Leonard Wong, "Stifled Innovation? Developing Tomorrow's Leaders Today" (Carlisle, PA: The Institute of Strategic Studies, April 2002). 2.
(3.) COL Daniel P. Bolger, The Battle for Hunger Hill (Novato, CA: Presidio Press, 1997), 88.
(4.) Ibid.
(5.) LTC Robert R. Leonhard, The Art of Maneuver (Novato, CA: Presidio Press, 1991), 50.
(6.) David M. Keithly and Stephen P. Ferris, "Auftragstaktik, or Directive Control, in Joint and Combined Operations," Parameters (Autumn 1999): 3, 118-33.
(7.) Ibid., 113.
(8.) Ibid., 52-53.
(9.) Carl von Clausewitz, On War, trans, and eds., Michael Howard and Peter Paret (New Jersey: Princeton University Press, 1989), 119.
(10.) Ibid., 117.
(11.) Ibid., 102.
(12.) Henri de Jomini, The Art of War (London: Greenhill Books, 1996), 196.
(13.) Sun Tzu, The Art of War, trans. Samuel B, Griffith (New York: Oxford University Press, 1963), 65.
(14.) Clausewitz, 101.
(15.) Antulio J. Echevarria II, "Moltke and the German Military Tradition: His Theories and Legacies," Parameters (Spring 1996): 1, 91-99.
Find Research Guides for:
Find Featured Titles for: Reference
- Academe
- African American Review
- African Arts
- African Studies Review
- Afro-Americans in New York Life and History
- Alabama Heritage
- Alabama Review
- American Mathematical Monthly, The
- Anglican Theological Review
- Annals of Dyslexia
- Arab Studies Quarterly (ASQ)
- Auk, The
- Australian Journal of Anthropology, The
- Christian Century
- Natural History