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Surrendering the initiative? C2 on the digitized battlefield
Military Review, Sept-Oct, 2003 by Jim Dunivan
Echoes from the Past
The Army temporarily embraced detailed control during the late 1960s when technology made some commanders feel they could best control a fight on the ground from a helicopter overhead. Although this was in direct conflict with official command philosophy of the time, the C2 helicopter and the PRC-25 radio gave the illusion of having perfect knowledge of the ground situation. The official command philosophy was that commanders should lead from the front, and the senior leader on the ground had the best perspective of the battle. Despite this, many commanders were seduced by the idea that they could influence a battle's outcome with direct, not mission-type, orders. (52) However, many others resisted the siren song.
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Despite the fact that some battalion commanders used their C2 helicopters as their "personal mounts," Lieutenant General Harold (Hal) G. Moore believed that a commander had to get on the ground with the soldiers to really sec and hear what was happening. He said, "You have to soak up firsthand information for your instincts to operate accurately. Besides, it's too easy to be crisp, cool, and detached at 1,500 feet; too easy to demand the impossible of your troops; too easy to make mistakes that are fatal only to those souls far below in the mud, the blood, and the confusion." (53)
Despite the great examples of leadership through directive control that commanders such as Moore portrayed, many chose detailed control as standard operating procedure. The predictable results were erosion of trust between subordinates and leaders, and a weakening of the chain of command. There was also a tragic decline in junior officers' and non-commissioned officers' willingness to initiate action without orders. The long-term effects of this particular conflict between technology and command philosophy were devastating. (54)
Battle Command and Directive Control
The same effects that occurred in Vietnam could recur on the modern Information-Age battlefield if Army leaders do not recognize and react by maintaining directive control within combat operations. Battle command, the exercise of command in operations against a hostile and thinking enemy, places a premium on leader skills and actions that contribute to effective, timely decisions.
Today's operational environment is saturated with technology. The fluid nature of operations and the volume of information available increases the importance of a leader's ability to visualize and describe the operations to direct actions and reactions on the battlefield. (55) As a result, the Army is modernizing information systems to an unprecedented degree. The intent of these improvements in digitizing the battlefield is to provide all leaders with near-real-time information that will allow them to understand the tactical situation and the commander's intent. However, while subordinate leaders have access to the broader tactical situation, higher echelon commanders have access to layers of tactical detail. Just like some commanders in their C2 helicopters in Vietnam, higher echelon commanders who yield to the temptation to direct tactical actions for their subordinates could reduce the benefits of advanced information systems and the situational understanding they support. (56)
