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Surrendering the initiative? C2 on the digitized battlefield
Military Review, Sept-Oct, 2003 by Jim Dunivan
In line with early definitions of information warfare, C2 warfare "is a dimension of conflict in which opposing armed forces attack each other's information systems and processes while protecting their own." (46) The purpose of this action is to create a condition on the battlefield in which friendly forces can perceive the battlefield, control its forces effectively, and act decisively while denying the enemy the capability of doing likewise. (47) The commander's ability to see the battlefield and know friendly and enemy locations and activities while commanding his own forces is, cumulatively, termed command, control, communications, and intelligence (C3I). C3I capabilities provide commanders and leaders at all levels with the ability to manage battle by allowing them to collect, analyze, disseminate, and act on battlefield information from a variety of sources. (48)
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These functions are not new to warfare. At least as early as the time of Alexander the Great, commanders needed these capabilities to direct battles. The great commanders of history recognized that victory on the battlefield depended on their ability to collect, analyze, disseminate, and act on battlefield information. English Field Marshal Arthur Wellesley (Lord Wellington) and other successful Napoleonic-era generals led from the front because doing so put them in the best position to collect, analyze, disseminate, and act on the information needed to influence the fight. Limited communications kept those commanders from commanding over great distances, but today's commanders have access to technology that can vastly improve C3I performance. (49)
Improved C3I has led some to question the utility of directive control. In The Principles of War for the Information Age, Lieutenant Colonel Robert Leonhard argues that although the improvement in information technology serves as an enabler for command, the Army has yet to see a clear exploitation of information technology. He says, "We are clinging to outdated doctrine that calls for decentralized command and control. It is illogical, pointless, and a waste of money for us to make our higher headquarters smarter in future battle if we intend to fanatically preach the doctrine of decentralization." (50)
According to Leonhard, directive control was only effective in the past because it synchronized authority with information flow. He says, "When the tempo of information flow gives subordinates a more accurate and timely view of the battlefield, then they should have decisionmaking authority that is commensurate with that information. When, on the other hand, the higher headquarters has the information faster, decisionmaking authority should be centralized." (51) While this argument appears to be logical and sound, it articulates the great flawed assumption of technologically based battle command--that technology will accurately provide a common operational picture to a higher headquarters that absolutely replicates the actual situation of the leader on the ground.
