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Precision firepower: smart bombs, dumb strategy
Military Review, July-August, 2003 by Timothy R. Reese
An enemy with limited but well-allocated, high-tech weapons of his own could stymie key parts of our offensive arsenal, which is precisely what Serbia was able to do in 1999. To deny NATO aircraft the signal needed to locate and destroy them, Serb air defense operators turned their radar off, which caused NATO planners to think twice and fly high before directly attacking Serbian ground forces. Serbian airpower's mere existence, not its use, kept NATO jets above 15,000 feet, which greatly degraded their effectiveness against Serb forces. NATO was forced to resort to bombing fixed, dual use military and civilian targets to bring pressure on Serbian President Slobodan Milosevic's government. (22) An enemy's ability to wait out, counter, or evade the effects of precision firepower neatly exposes the theory's shortcomings.
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Moral implications. Precision firepower theory raises unique, thorny moral dilemmas. What were the moral implications of attacking Serbian dual-use infrastructure to avoid ground combat against Serbian paramilitaries committing atrocities in Kosovo? How much direct and indirect harm can the U.S. impose on civilians near such targets to limit the risk to U.S. pilots? The international outcry against the bombing campaign, some from within NATO itself, certainly encouraged Milosevic to hold out in hopes of a collapse of NATO will or unity. (23) The International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia briefly contemplated indicting NATO military leaders for violating the law of war. (24) That persuasion is a game both sides can play and is a factor precision firepower advocates often ignore.
The United States' preference for bombing instead of conducting ground operations has caused many leaders in the developing word to view the United States as a powerful but cowardly bully. The United States appears willing to lob missiles and bombs at an enemy from afar but unwilling to confront its foes "honorably." (25) Our impressive technology does not seem to intimidate our enemies into submission, but to encourage them to find new ways to resist our strengths and to attack our weaknesses asymmetrically.
Precision Firepower Theory's Seductive Nature
The use of precision firepower also seduces U.S. foreign policymakers to resort quickly to the use of force as a substitute for grand strategy. Unlike the complicated, costly synchronization of all of the elements of power over time to achieve foreign policy objectives, precision firepower seems to promise a rapid, risk-free path to victory that uses limited military force. USAF Colonel Phillip S. Meilinger argues, "Aerospace power ... should be our weapon of choice because it is the most discriminate, prudent, and risk-free weapon in our arsenal." (26)
As with every seduction, however, the excitement of the chase soon is replaced by discontent and even misery. The ability to destroy fixed targets in the enemy's homeland is not a substitute for strategy. As U.S. joint doctrine warns, "There is a delicate balance between the desire for quick victory and termination on truly favorable terms." (27) Precision firepower tends to tip that balance toward quick victory.
