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Precision firepower: smart bombs, dumb strategy
Military Review, July-August, 2003 by Timothy R. Reese
(26.) Phillip K. Meilinger, "Precision Aerospace power. Discrimination, and the Future of War," Aerospace Power Journal 15 (Fall 2001): 12.
(27.) Joint Publication (JP) 3-0, Doctrine for Joint Operations (Washington, DC: GPO, 10 September 2001), 111-24.
(28.) See Stephen Hosmer, Project Air Force. The Conflict Over Kosovo: Why Milosevic Decided to Settle When He Did (Santa Monica, CA: RAND, 2001).
(29.) Liddell-Hart.
(30.) Clausewitz, 570. See also pages 86-87 for the distinction between theoretical war and the actual conduct of war.
(31.) JP 3-0, III-25.
(32.) Clausewitz, 77.
(33.) Field Manual 3-0: Operations (Washington, DC: GPO, 14 June 2001), 1-6.
(34.) The North Vietnamese suffered terribly from U.S. bombing but still conquered Saigon on 30 April 1975. The U.S. experience in Iraq and the Balkans shows that this lesson has been learned well by our opponents.
(35.) James Dao, "Bash Sets Role for US. in Afghan Rebuilding," New York Times, 18 April 2002, 1. See also Michael Zielenger, "In Afghanistan, Senators Urge U.S. to Help Rebuild Nation," Philadelphia Inquirer, 2 April 2002.
(36.) Biddle examines this issue in depth and neatly demonstrates why the "Afghan model" is not an example of firepower determining the outcome and the dangers for U.S. foreign policy of applying this model to future conflicts.
(37.) US. Joint Forces Command, A Concept for Rapid Decisive Operations (Washington, DC: GPO, Final Draft, 25 October 2001), v.
Lieutenant Colonel Timothy R. Reese, U.S. Army, is Director, Cavalry and Armor Proponency Office, U.S. Army Armor Center, Fort Knox. He received a B.S. from the U.S. Military Academy, an M.A from the University of Michigan, and he is a graduate of the U.S. Army War College. He has served in various command and staff positions in the United States, Germany, and Kosovo.
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