The Victory Disease

Military Review,  July-August, 2003  by Timothy M. Karcher

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To secure ourselves against defeat lies in our own hands, but the opportunity of defeating the enemy is provided by the enemy himself.

--Sun Tzu (1)

LIEUTENANT GENERAL William S. Wallace, the U.S. Army's senior ground commander in Iraq said, "The enemy we're fighting is different from the one we war-gamed against." (2) Wallace's comment acknowledges a disturbing cultural phenomenon that can be found throughout the U.S. military and society. The problem stems from two necessary preconditions--demonstrated military prowess and great national strength that make the Nation and its military forces susceptible to a significant future defeat. Because of the United State' vast strength, national and military leaders might become overconfident in the Armed Forces' abilities and begin to underestimated the enemy's capabilities, two practices that could sow the seeds of disaster.

This cultural phenomenon manifests itself in a mindset, sometimes referred to as the Victory Disease, which makes a nation susceptible to defeat on future battlefields. Military analysts James Dunnigan and Raymond Macedonia highlight the concept of the Victory Disease in their work, Getting It Right: American Military Reforms After Vietnam to the Gulf War and Beyond. (3) According to Dunnigan and Macedonia, The Victory Disease threatens a nation that has a history of military prowess and manifests itself in three symptoms: arrogance, complacency, and established patterns of fighting. As these symptoms compound, the result might be the unanticipated defeat of a previously victorious nation.

The Victory Disease does not always lead to battlefield defeat; it simply increases the likelihood of failure. Since preconditions might exist for the United Sates to fall prey to the Victory Disease, the question is whether the U.S. Army can decrease the likelihood of military disasters in future operations.

The Victory Disease might occur across all of the defined levels of war--strategic, operational, and tactical. At the strategic level of war, the Victory Disease might afflict a nation's citizens, national political leaders, and senior military leaders. At the tactical and operational levels of war, the disease might infect military leaders and planners.

To understand the Victory Disease, one must first understand its symptoms. Historical examples illustrate the symptoms of the disease and how they interact to bring about defeat. Seldom are symptoms as obvious as they might appear. Hindsight enhances the obviousness of the symptoms. One must avoid judging past leaders, since clarity comes through the prism of historical analysis. The danger comes from how easily and gradually the disease can creep into the thinking of national and military leaders.

The Symptoms in History

Certain preconditions are requisite for the Victory Disease to occur. A nation must be powerful militarily and have a history of recent victories. Military forces that have recently suffered an ignominious defeat are quick to analyze their failings and take corrective action, while victorious militaries rarely analyze their recent victories to improve. History records the Phoenix-like rising of a defeated army more often than a victor's analyzing a recent victory. (4) Based on the requirement for vast national strength and a proven military capability, the United States is clearly susceptible to the Victory Disease. Once these preconditions exist, the symptoms of the Victory Disease might bergin to flourish.

Arrogance. A nation with a strong, proven military and a highly developed economy will display a national pride that can easily develop into arrogance. National arrogance can lead to an expectation for quick, decisive victories in almost any undertaking, especially a military conflict. At the strategic level of war, senior military leaders begin to believe that their vastly superior forces cannot be defeated. At the operational and tactical levels of warfighting, military units evince arrogance based on their unit's battlefield victories. Perhaps the greatest problem with arrogance is that it leads to unrealistic expectations, from the national level down to the lowest unit.

Events that occurred near Fort Phil Kearney, Wyoming, in the winter of 1866 illustrate an excellent example of tactical arrogance. Fort

Phil Kearney, near modern-day Sheridan, was the site of significant contact between U.S. forces and hostile Sioux during a period referred to as "Red Cloud's War." (5) During the conflict, a brash young officer, twice awarded brevet promotions for bravery during the American Civil War, displayed a deadly level of arrogance. (5) Captain William J. Fetterman, only recently arrived from duties in the East, boasted that with a mere 80 men, he could "ride through the whole Sioux Nation," an enemy he ridiculed as being beneath his regard. (7)

On 21 December 1866, Fettermen led his command (eerily numbering 81 men) into a well-laid Sioux ambush. Every member of his command was killed. (8) Fettermen's contempt for the Sioux's warfighting ability and his overconfidence in his own military prowess and in the capability of his own mixed force of infantry and cavalry illustrate the effect of arrogance on a formerly victorious military leader.