Jeb Stuart and the Confederate Defeat at Gettysburg

JEB STUART AND THE CONFEDERATE DEFEAT AT GETTYSBURG, Warren C. Robinson, University of Nebraska Press, Lincoln, 2007, 198 pages, $24.95.

I must go over the ground again.--Edmund Blunden, Undertones of War

Why do we need another book on such a time-worn topic as the Gettysburg campaign of the American Civil War? William C. Robinson's impetus for producing a new work is straightforward: to establish definitively whether or not Jeb Stuart's failure to appear at Gettysburg on I July 1863 really is one of the prime reasons Gettysburg proved a major blow to the Confederacy.

Prior to Gettysburg, Stuart's raids on Union camps greatly aided Lee in his victory at Second Manassas; his maneuvering impeded the flow of Union General George McClellan's forces, and he proficiently kept Lee informed of the intentions or whereabouts of Union generals Ambrose Burnside and Joseph Hooker, thus facilitating Lee's victories at Fredericksburg and Chancellorsville. Lee trusted Stuart implicitly. However, the picture began to muddy around June 1863 as Stuart let the more cavalier part of his personality dominate over his operational imperative to screen Lee's Array. Lee trusted Stuart to use the good sense and discretion he had exercised in the recent past, but the cavalry commander chose instead to embark on a deleterious raiding spree that only harassed--but did not delay--the pace of the Union forces' march across the Potomac on their way to counter Lee. In the month prior to the battle of Gettysburg, Stuart broke contact with Lee for several critical days, even though his was the only substantive body of cavalry with the experience and, resources, to screen Lee from Union forces.

By the time Stuart's men arrived at Gettysburg, it was far too late for them to make an impact on the battle. Only if "Stuart had achieved surprise and gained the Union rear 'unhindered' can one imagine his movement's having an impact on the outcome on Cemetery Ridge."

In developing his thesis, Robinson does not discount other factors affecting Stuart's actions, such as terrain, the availability of fords across strategic rivers--major considerations for maneuverability and logistics--and whether or not Stuart's actions were sparked by a desire to avenge his cavalry's beating at Brandy Station early in June 1863. Nonetheless, much of "the legendary elusiveness of Lee's array was due to Stuart's skill at providing it with an impenetrable screen of cavalry scouts." Had Stuart been in a tactically sound position, he could have disrupted the Union army's excellent spy network and kept the Union commanders in the dark about Lee's whereabouts; the battle that precipitated the Confederacy's fall might never have happened. In the end, though, Robinson does not ignore wider factors concerning; Stuart's actions, and Lee remains accountable for the overall loss of the battle as his orders to Stuart should have been more explicit.

Robinson's research was extensive: he culled over 145 primary and secondary sources, many of them among academic heavy-hitters of Civil War history. He includes 15 pages of notes, four theater-level maps, and several photos and battlefield sketches relative to the Gettysburg campaign. It is unlikely that Robinson's work will satisfy all Civil War scholars and students, but whatever its eventual reception in academic circles, this is an enthralling work of history.

MAJ Jeffrey C. Alfier, USAF, Retired, Ramstein, Germany

COPYRIGHT 2008 U.S. Army CGSC
COPYRIGHT 2008 Gale, Cengage Learning