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Military Review, March-April, 2006 by Dale Andrade, James H. Willbanks
(25.) These figures have been compiled by the authors from several sources. For statistics on 1969-70, sea Jeffrey J. Clarke, Advice and Support: The Final Years, 1965-1973 (Washington, DC: CMH, 1988), 373.
(26.) Thayer, 884-87.
(27.) The history of the North Vietnamese 9th Division points out that one of its primary missions in 1969-1970 was to "frustrate the enemy's pacification plan." See Su Dean 9 [9th Division] (Hanoi: Nha Xuat Ban Quan Doi Nhan Dan [People's Army Publishing House], 1990), 100.
(28.) Hamlet Evaluation Survey (HES) Annual Statistical Analysis, 1968-71, Historians files, CMH, Fort McNair, Washington, D.C.
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(29.) The Intelligence Coordination and Exploitation Program (ICEX) was established by MACV Directive 381-41, "Military Intelligence: Coordination and Exploitation for Attack on the VC Infrastructure; Short Title: ICEX: 9 July 1967, Historians files, CMH, Fort McNair, Washington, D.C. For a detailed study of ICEX, see Ralph W. Johnson, "Phoenix/Phung Hoang: A Study of Wartime Intelligence Management" (Ph.D. diss, The American University, 1985).
(30.) Dale Andrede, Ashes to Ashes: The Phoenix Program and the Vietnam War (Lexington, MA: Lexington Books, 1990), Appen. A-2, "Resource Allocations."
(31.) Ibid., 87-91.
(32.) Data on the Provincial Reconnaissance Units (PRU) is scarce, but soma useful documents exist. For general information see MACV "Fact Sheet: Provincial Reconnaissance Units (PRU), RVN," 16 October 1969. For neutralization statistics see Thayer, A Systems Analysis View of the Vietnam War, 1965-1972, 10 (publishing information unavailable), 91.
(33.) Deputy Undersecretary of the Army John Siena to Secretary of Defense Melvin Laird, Subject: Memorandum of Army Vietnam Trip, 28 August 1969, Historians files, CMH, Fort McNair, Washington, D.C.
(34.) Ibid., 61; Military Advisory Command CORDS-PSD, "Fact Sheet: Legal Processing of VCI Detainees," 8 June 1970, 3, Historians' files, CMH, Fort McNair, Washington, D.C.
(35.) Andrade, appen. A-1, "Phoenix/Phung Hoang Neutralization Results."
(36.) Phuong Huang 1970 End of Year Report, 11 May 1971, 4-5, Historians' files, CMH, Fort McNair, Washington, D.C.
(37.) MACCORDS-PSD, "Fact Sheet," 2.
(38.) By mid-1969, U.S. Army division operational reports contained numerous references to captured enemy plans that aimed to "disrupt pacification," in particular the Regional Forcas/Popular Forces (RF/PF) and Phoenix programs, because these were a constant threat to Communist domination in the villages. Sea also memorandum to William Colby from Wilbur Wilson, Deputy for CORDS, Subject: Motivation of [Government of Vietnam] GVN Leadership in the Phung Hoang Program, 24 June 1971, Historians files, CMH, Fort McNair, Washington, D.C.
(39.) "Military Activity Plan of Sub-Region 5: July-September 1970, no. 25/KH," from captured document log no. 09-1366-70, 3, Historians files, CMH, Fort McNeir, Washington, D.C.
