Nashville: The Western Confederacy's Final Gamble

Military Review,  July-August, 2005  by Scott A. Porter

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NASHVILLE: The Western Confederacy's Final Gamble, James Lee McDonough, The University of Tennessee Press, Knoxville, 2004, 358 pages, $33.46.

Faced with overwhelming odds against an army twice its size and leading a half-starved, poorly-equipped force during a winter campaign, Confederate General John Bell Hood never had a chance to reclaim middle Tennessee from the Union Army. Hood's poor command decisions only made a bad situation worse, and in effect, doomed his southern forces.

Hood missed an opportunity in Franklin, Tennessee, to strike Union forces on the march and ordered a frontal assault into the teeth of the Union's main defense. Once at Franklin, conditions were set for a successive disaster at the battle of Nashville. Although Hood chose to take the defensive rather than capture Nashville proper, he did not have the forces necessary to withstand a major Union assault.

James Lee McDonough points out Hood's poor command decisions while pointing out the heroic accounts of individual soldiers and regiments. Unfortunately, the story is difficult to follow because McDonough tries to explain unit movements and tactical maneuvers without using adequate graphics. He provides only two simple sketches of Nashville, one from 1864 and one from 2004. The maps add little information for those unfamiliar with Nashville and are not precise enough to provide meaningful information for those who are familiar.

The book is a worthwhile study in battle command, however, and provides a good analysis of the complexities and interaction of decisionmaking at the tactical and operational levels.

LTC Scott A. Porter, USA, Retired, Fort Leavenworth, Kansas

COPYRIGHT 2005 U.S. Army CGSC
COPYRIGHT 2008 Gale, Cengage Learning