Do we need FA30? Creating an information warfare branch

Military Review,  Jan-Feb, 2005  by George C.L. Brown

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Do not say, "Why were the old days better than these?" For it is not wise to ask such questions.

--Ecclesiastes 7:10 (1)

TO BUILD the correct blend of capabilities necessary to conduct the Global War on Terrorism (GWOT) during the information age, the Army should create an information warfare (IW) branch. Current information operations (IO) training and force composition are inadequate to meet the GWOT challenge.

Army Deputy Chief of Staff for Operations and Plans, General Richard A. Cody, recently released "The Army IO Intent" to provide guidance for the Army IO campaign plan and to amplify and supplement IO capabilities. (2) Cody advocated creating "a proponency capable of integrating with joint and Army IO and resourced for 'branch-like' advocacy." (3) Cody's use of the phrase "branch-like advocacy" reveals high-level Army leaders realize the need for an IO or IW branch. What qualities should fully trained IW branch officers have, and what knowledge and understanding should they possess?

During the Army 2003 World Wide PSYOP [psychological operations] Conference, senior leaders discussed the future combined education path and the need for merging IO-related functional areas (FAs). In a paper titled "Merging IO, PSYOP, and FAO [foreign area officer], Concept for the New Foreign Officer," Major Fredric W. Rohm, Jr., proposed such a merger. (4) The current FA30 (IO) program attracts officers from across the basic branches; however, most have little experience in core IO elements such as PSYOP, computer network operations (CNO), electronic warfare (EW), military deception, and operational security (OPSEC). The Department of Defense (DOD) "IO Roadmap" recommends developing "IO specialists who would be functional experts in one or more of the highly specialized core capabilities...." (5) The "IO Roadmap" also states: "IO specialists should possess specialized expertise on a certain IO core capability, but gain experience in [planning and executing] the broader construct of IO." (6)

Courses of Action

To achieve the joint "IO Roadmap's" objectives, I propose two courses of action (COAs) for DOD and the Army. Currently, FA30 resides within the IO support career field, while key elements like FA39 (PSYOP) reside in the operations career field. Core pillars such as deception and CNO do not exist in an associated branch or functional area other than introductory training in the Army IO course. Currently, EW officers (EWOs) are in FA35G (Signal Intelligence [SIGINT]/EW) within the military intelligence (MI) branch, also in the operations career field. Few are available to serve as EWOs in division and corps IO cells because of their duties as SIGINT officers.

Delays in initiating the Army's 4-week IO training program at Fort Leavenworth, Kansas, and insufficient personnel available in the training pipeline compound the difficulties in producing trained IO officers. Many officers are thus forced into on-the-job (OJT) training. Can we really expect IO officers with only 4 weeks of IO training to fully understand the complexities of 12 IO elements and 2 related activities and successfully employ the 5 core IO pillars?

Recognizing this inability, commanders have often drafted officers from the most closely related specialties to carry the brunt of the IO burden. Public affairs (PA), PSYOP, or civil affairs (CA) officers often serve as IO officers, even when an untrained IO warrior is on station. Emphasizing this fact, Cody suggests the need for "specific marketing and international media skills to familiarize IO staff officers on how civilian entities plan, prepare, execute, and influence activities. Furthermore..., IO officers should have cross-cultural communications and awareness." (7) These are the traits and characteristics that comprise the backgrounds of current PA, PSYOP, and CA officers, and FAOs.

The IO community loses credibility by not having trained IO warriors. Because of this deficiency, PAOs and PSYOP or CA officers often perform IO duties instead of their primary duties, resulting in mediocre performance in those areas as well because they must split their focus. I recommend two COAs to correct the problem:

1. Create a system that feeds related functional areas into FA30.

2. Create an IW branch.

FA feeder system. Using officers from IO-related FA specialties as IO officers is the norm. Commanders fill the void caused by the lack of trained IO planners with officers from related specialties. During Operation Iraqi Freedom, senior PSYOP officers were primary IO planners for the Central Command IO staff, the Third Army/Combined Force Land Component Command, the V Corps IO staff, and the Joint Special Operations Task Force-North. In all these commands, PSYOP officers served quite capably as IO planners during the first three phases of combat. (8) Based on this, the Army should establish a formal system that identifies, tracks, and feeds FA30 with individuals from IO-related specialties to produce well-rounded IO officers.